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It was an act of courage on the part of Myres S. McDougal to
undertake, in the 1950s, a book about the law of war. It was the height of
the Cold War. Large numbers of nuclear weapons were poised to destroy
the United States, the Soviet Union, and much of the rest of humanity. The
clock of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists read two minutes to midnight.
Public perception of the danger was acute. School children in the United
States were undergoing not the ordinary fire drills, but nuclear attack drills.
People were building bomb shelters in their backyards, underneath the
barbecue grills.
When we began our study, scholarship on the law of war was almost
evenly divided between two camps. One camp, the Realists, assumed that a
law of war had become impossible. A very distinguished Belgian jurist,
Charles de Visscher, in his influential Theory and Reality in Public
International Law, counseled his academic colleagues:
The new weapons of mass destruction have revolutionized all the
data of war, and it is above all for this reason that the jurists will be
well advised to waste no further time in what some of them still
persist in calling the "restatement" of the laws of war. To try to
adapt these laws to the new conditions is not only labor absolutely
lost; it is an enterprise that in certain of its aspects may be
dangerous .... There is better work to be done today than picking
up the fragments of an obsolete body of rules.1
The other camp was composed of equally distinguished and deeply
committed, but perhaps somewhat romantic, scholars. These scholars
assembled formulations of rules enumerated over the last one and a half
centuries and attempted to weave them into a coherent set of propositions
that somehow, they hoped, would restrain top political and military leaders
and battlefield commanders. Precisely because the issues involved were so
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important to the future of mankind, Myres McDougal identified this subject
for the first of a series of treatises on international law that he was
projecting. I had the honor, which I have treasured throughout my life, of
being invited to collaborate with him on the project. My preparation was
limited. I had read the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and the
Geneva 1929 Prisoners of War Convention during my undergraduate days
in the law school of the University of the Philippines. However, my
experience during the belligerent occupation of the Philippines by Japan
during the Second World War had not inspired a deep faith in the efficacy
of this law.
We started our work with no illusions. We assumed nothing-certainly
not the basic premise of other scholars that war and peace had to be
distinguished sharply since each state or condition of things had attached to
it a separate corpus of rules-the law of peace and the law of war-that
operated successively, at different times, one to the exclusion of the other.
We understood that whether the terms "war" and "peace"; "low intensity
conflict" and "peace"; or "no war and no peace," were used or not by
legislators, administrators, or judges, nation-states exercised against each
other a continuously varying degree of coercion. That coercion may range
from a very low, perhaps negligible level, in which case we spoke of
influence in basically consensual types of political and economic situations,
all the way to the opposite pole of very intense applications of military
violence resulting in more or less widespread destruction of human life and
property and environment. A treatise that sought to grapple with these
factual processes across state boundaries would have to be organized quite
differently from the standard texts.
At the outset, therefore, we described in comprehensive terms those
phases of interaction across state boundaries that are marked by a relatively
high degree of coercion exercised with a relatively extensive destruction of
human life and other human values. We also described the processes of
decisionmaking in which authoritative or legal norms were thought to play
some role, by which processes the international community sought to
control, regulate, or mitigate the processes of force and violence. We
identified the major types of controversies that posed common or related
issues of policy and that are addressed by various officials-executive,
military, or judicial-located in various levels and phases of the continuous
processes by which authoritative decisions are made and implemented. The
central aspect of our enterprise was the effort to articulate and clarify the
essential principles of minimum or basic order-that is to say, the
principles indispensable for achieving that minimum of public order
without which the bonds of society break apart and there is only the
darkness of chaos and the war of each against all others.
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When recourse to force does occur, the community policies needed to
reduce to a minimum the destruction of life and other human values also
need to be clarified and examined in detail. We reviewed the scholarly
literature in detail and discovered that much of the learning and rhetoric in
use did not contribute significantly to intellectual clarification or to
identification of the necessary policies.
We appreciated that one of the most difficult problems in the field was
that of distinguishing between lawful and unlawful resort to intense
coercion, i.e., military force or violence. This had been a recurring problem
in the application of the law of war for centuries, and it had become a front-
line problem when the United Nations Charter was promulgated at the end
of the Second World War. We rejected "bright line" formulations or catchy
phrases that seemed to permit a decisionmaker, with apparent ease, to
decide quickly whether particular exercises of coercion, especially intense
coercion, were lawful or unlawful. Instead, considering the complexities in
the transborder applications of coercion, and especially the difficulties of
objective fact finding in international relations, we suggested a framework
and modes of explicit, systematic, and contextual examination of
applications of force and violence, and we appraised those in terms of
short- and long-term goals of the community of nations before concluding
that particular uses of coercion were lawful or not.
One of the most important functions of an organized community is the
initiation and management of sanctions in order to secure the
implementation of law in respect of resort to force, as well as law about
particular exercises of force. We examined the arsenal of instruments
available to the international community and, more important in my view,
we analyzed the various strategic objectives of sanctions operations.
We examined as well the issues of neutrality in the world where the
United Nations Charter had been promulgated, but whose levels of
commitment had already begun to be eroded.
We also explored the law of war in actual combat situations. Here we
sought to develop sets of criteria that could assist a decisionmaker (whether
a battlefield commander or a judge of a court-martial or of a war-crimes
tribunal) in addressing such questions as who the permissible combatants
were and which weapons were permissible in what types of situations to
achieve what levels of destruction. I believe we were among the earliest to
observe that the law of war in combat situations is in fact the law of human
rights in armed conflict situations.
Finally, we explored in detail the complex subject of belligerent
occupation, a subject whose recurrent importance we had not contemplated
at that time. In recent times, though, it is as contemporary as the wars in the
Persian Gulf, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and the Congo.
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The reception of Law and Minimum World Public Order: The Legal
Regulation of International Coercion was itself an interesting story. The
book promptly became a vade mecum in ministries of defense in many
countries. Its utility for national war colleges and legal advisers to defense
and foreign affairs ministries derived as much from the comprehensiveness
and thoroughness of the detailed examination of the legal instruments and
doctrinal literature as well as case law on the subject, as from the method of
thinking about problems that it offered. In the United States Department of
Defense, I have it on good authority that Mac became something of a hero.
Mac himself, however, admitted only that after our book came out, he
became a private consultant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and served as such
for a substantial period of time. In the then-Soviet bloc countries, the book
was analyzed in detail and frequently criticized, but I was told that certain
approaches taken in subsequent Soviet bloc literature indicated that even
that literature was not completely immune from our book's influence. I
leave it to you to decide whether that was a commendable thing or not.
What I can testify from personal experience was that some of our basic
concepts-those relating to management of combat operations and to
belligerent occupation-find reflection in the Two Additional Protocols of
1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Indeed some of the language of
Protocol One sounds remarkably similar to language found in certain
chapters of our book. After the 1977 Protocols were adopted by the
intergovernmental conference, I suggested to Mac that at long last, our
book and its authors had become respectable.
Looking back over almost forty years since the book was first
published, I think it is clear that the approach we developed with respect to
determining the lawfulness of weapon selection and application in combat
situations has become the standard mode of analysis. Our theory of
sanctions, which I believe is a distinctive contribution to the jurisprudential
literature, is now reflected in the many appraisals of war-crimes tribunals,
truth and reconciliation commissions, compensation commissions, and
other institutional means for dealing with grave violations of the law of war
and for stitching together the social fabric that armed conflict tears asunder.
Our analysis of aggression and neutrality, however, seems to have been
largely overtaken by time and global political developments. Despite the
general language of the collective security system in the United Nations
Charter and its virtual universality, states seem unwilling to accept the
obligations that it necessarily entails. Professor McDougal would very
probably have thought that there will yet be a sad price to pay for this
backing away from law, and I fear that he would be correct.
This brief account of the impact that Myres McDougal had on the law
of war would be incomplete if I did not mention the impact he had on a
young student from the Philippines who had come to Yale for graduate
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education. That young student could hardly have anticipated that he would
be befriended by this towering figure in international law, made into a
collaborator, and that the professor would stand by as a warm and
committed personal friend and father figure, and a caring friend of my own
children, for a lifetime. Most if not all of the important things that have
happened to me in the course of my own career in the law have been in
some way or another connected to collaboration with, and the teaching and
friendship of, Myres McDougal.

